ai-research-survey

Systematic scan of agentic development research. What's signal, what's noise.
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scan-v5.json (26496B)


      1 {
      2   "scan_version": 5,
      3   "paper_type": "empirical",
      4   "paper": {
      5     "title": "Exploring adversarial robustness of JPEG AI: methodology, comparison and new methods",
      6     "authors": [
      7       "Egor Kovalev",
      8       "Georgii Bychkov",
      9       "Khaled Abud",
     10       "A. Gushchin",
     11       "A. Chistyakova",
     12       "Sergey Lavrushkin",
     13       "Dmitriy Vatolin",
     14       "Anastasia Antsiferova"
     15     ],
     16     "year": 2024,
     17     "venue": "arXiv.org",
     18     "arxiv_id": "2411.11795",
     19     "doi": "10.48550/arXiv.2411.11795"
     20   },
     21   "checklist": {
     22     "claims_and_evidence": {
     23       "abstract_claims_supported": {
     24         "applies": true,
     25         "answer": true,
     26         "justification": "Abstract claims (first large-scale JPEG AI robustness evaluation, comparison across 10 codecs, defense strategies) are all demonstrated in Results sections 5.1–5.7.",
     27         "source": "haiku"
     28       },
     29       "causal_claims_justified": {
     30         "applies": true,
     31         "answer": false,
     32         "justification": "Paper makes comparative claims ('JPEG AI is more robust than Cheng2020') but doesn't justify causation—no ablation studies isolating architectural features responsible for robustness differences.",
     33         "source": "haiku"
     34       },
     35       "generalization_bounded": {
     36         "applies": true,
     37         "answer": false,
     38         "justification": "Results presented across 4 datasets but scope not explicitly bounded; paper doesn't discuss whether findings generalize to out-of-distribution images or different compression ratios.",
     39         "source": "haiku"
     40       },
     41       "alternative_explanations_discussed": {
     42         "applies": true,
     43         "answer": false,
     44         "justification": "Paper explains that adversarial noise alters rate-distortion tradeoff but doesn't discuss why HOP variants are less robust than BOP or propose alternative mechanistic explanations for codec differences.",
     45         "source": "haiku"
     46       },
     47       "proxy_outcome_distinction": {
     48         "applies": true,
     49         "answer": true,
     50         "justification": "Paper clearly distinguishes measurement (∆PSNR, ∆VMAF quality drops) from claim (robustness)—the delta-metrics directly operationalize the robustness construct.",
     51         "source": "haiku"
     52       }
     53     },
     54     "limitations_and_scope": {
     55       "limitations_section_present": {
     56         "applies": true,
     57         "answer": false,
     58         "justification": "No dedicated limitations section. Conclusion mentions that 'assessing attack success in NICs remains challenging' but does not systematically discuss scope boundaries or threats to validity.",
     59         "source": "haiku"
     60       },
     61       "threats_to_validity_specific": {
     62         "applies": true,
     63         "answer": false,
     64         "justification": "No specific threats discussed (e.g., whether white-box attacks overestimate real-world risk, whether 4 attack runs are sufficient, whether standard datasets represent production image distributions).",
     65         "source": "haiku"
     66       },
     67       "scope_boundaries_stated": {
     68         "applies": true,
     69         "answer": false,
     70         "justification": "Paper focuses on white-box attacks (justified by 'compression is purification') and 4 standard datasets, but doesn't explicitly state what the results do NOT show (e.g., black-box robustness, defenses against adaptive attacks).",
     71         "source": "haiku"
     72       }
     73     },
     74     "conflicts_of_interest": {
     75       "funding_disclosed": {
     76         "applies": true,
     77         "answer": false,
     78         "justification": "No funding acknowledgment section visible in paper. Authors are from MSU, ISP RAS, and Innopolis but no funding source stated.",
     79         "source": "haiku"
     80       },
     81       "affiliations_disclosed": {
     82         "applies": true,
     83         "answer": true,
     84         "justification": "All authors list institutional affiliations (MSU, ISP RAS, Innopolis University) with email addresses.",
     85         "source": "haiku"
     86       },
     87       "funder_independent_of_outcome": {
     88         "applies": false,
     89         "answer": false,
     90         "justification": "NA—no funding disclosed.",
     91         "source": "haiku"
     92       },
     93       "financial_interests_declared": {
     94         "applies": true,
     95         "answer": false,
     96         "justification": "No competing interests or financial disclosures statement present.",
     97         "source": "haiku"
     98       }
     99     },
    100     "scope_and_framing": {
    101       "key_terms_defined": {
    102         "applies": true,
    103         "answer": true,
    104         "justification": "Neural image compression (Section 3: analysis transform, quantization, entropy coding, synthesis transform), adversarial attack (Eq. 2: perturbation δ constrained by ε), and white-box attack motivation are precisely defined.",
    105         "source": "haiku"
    106       },
    107       "intended_contribution_clear": {
    108         "applies": true,
    109         "answer": true,
    110         "justification": "Three explicit contributions stated: (1) extended methodology with 4 quality metrics; (2) first large-scale JPEG AI evaluation on 10 codecs × 6 attacks; (3) defense evaluation. Clearly positioned as methodology + empirical study.",
    111         "source": "haiku"
    112       },
    113       "engagement_with_prior_work": {
    114         "applies": true,
    115         "answer": true,
    116         "justification": "Section 2 reviews neural image compression evolution, JPEG AI standardization, and prior adversarial robustness work (Kang et al., Chen & Ma). Paper positions itself as first large-scale JPEG AI robustness study.",
    117         "source": "haiku"
    118       }
    119     }
    120   },
    121   "type_checklist": {
    122     "empirical": {
    123       "artifacts": {
    124         "code_released": {
    125           "applies": true,
    126           "answer": false,
    127           "justification": "Abstract states 'code are publicly available online (link is hidden for a blind review)'—promise made but URL withheld, so reproducibility cannot be verified at submission.",
    128           "source": "haiku"
    129         },
    130         "data_released": {
    131           "applies": true,
    132           "answer": true,
    133           "justification": "All four datasets are publicly standard (KODAK Photo CD, CITYSCAPES, NIPS 2017 Adversarial Learning, BSDS) without custom modifications.",
    134           "source": "haiku"
    135         },
    136         "environment_specified": {
    137           "applies": true,
    138           "answer": false,
    139           "justification": "Section 4.6 lists hardware (120 × Tesla A100, Intel Xeon) and mentions 'source code of JPEG AI' but no requirements.txt, Docker, or Python version specs provided.",
    140           "source": "haiku"
    141         },
    142         "reproduction_instructions": {
    143           "applies": true,
    144           "answer": false,
    145           "justification": "Methodology describes attacks, datasets, and metrics but lacks step-by-step runnable instructions. Attack parameters ('learning rate, number of iterations, perturbation bound') mentioned but not instantiated.",
    146           "source": "haiku"
    147         }
    148       },
    149       "statistical_methodology": {
    150         "confidence_intervals_or_error_bars": {
    151           "applies": true,
    152           "answer": false,
    153           "justification": "Figures 2–9 report point estimates (mean ∆VMAF, average BSQ-rate). Section 4.6 notes 'applied each attack four times...and averaged' but no CI or error bars shown.",
    154           "source": "haiku"
    155         },
    156         "significance_tests": {
    157           "applies": true,
    158           "answer": false,
    159           "justification": "No p-values, t-tests, or statistical significance tests reported. Results presented as descriptive comparisons across methods.",
    160           "source": "haiku"
    161         },
    162         "effect_sizes_reported": {
    163           "applies": true,
    164           "answer": true,
    165           "justification": "∆PSNR, ∆MSE, ∆MS-SSIM, ∆VMAF, BSQ-rate, and artifact metrics (Color, Texture) all quantify effect magnitude with baseline context.",
    166           "source": "haiku"
    167         },
    168         "sample_size_justified": {
    169           "applies": true,
    170           "answer": false,
    171           "justification": "Four attack runs per codec-attack pair mentioned, but no power analysis or justification that n=4 is sufficient to estimate robust delta-metrics.",
    172           "source": "haiku"
    173         },
    174         "variance_reported": {
    175           "applies": true,
    176           "answer": false,
    177           "justification": "Paper averages 4 attack runs but reports only means; no standard deviations, confidence intervals, or per-image variance across the three 4-dataset split.",
    178           "source": "haiku"
    179         }
    180       },
    181       "evaluation_design": {
    182         "baselines_included": {
    183           "applies": true,
    184           "answer": true,
    185           "justification": "Compares JPEG AI (3 versions) against 10 other neural compression methods: Balle 2018, CDC, Cheng2020, ELIC, EVC, HiFiC, Li-TCM, mbt2018 variants, QRES-VAE.",
    186           "source": "haiku"
    187         },
    188         "baselines_contemporary": {
    189           "applies": true,
    190           "answer": true,
    191           "justification": "Models range 2018–2024; most comparisons (Cheng2020-attn, EVC, HiFiC, ELIC) are from 2020–2022, contemporary to JPEG AI 4.1–6.1 (2023–2024).",
    192           "source": "haiku"
    193         },
    194         "ablation_study": {
    195           "applies": true,
    196           "answer": false,
    197           "justification": "Paper compares different attack loss functions and defenses but does not ablate individual architectural components (e.g., attention, context modeling) within JPEG AI to isolate robustness drivers.",
    198           "source": "haiku"
    199         },
    200         "multiple_metrics": {
    201           "applies": true,
    202           "answer": true,
    203           "justification": "Four quality metrics (PSNR, MSE, MS-SSIM, VMAF), two artifact detectors (Color, Texture), BPP, transferability metric (∆̂VMAF), and defense comparison metrics.",
    204           "source": "haiku"
    205         },
    206         "human_evaluation": {
    207           "applies": false,
    208           "answer": false,
    209           "justification": "NA—paper evaluates automatic image quality metrics, not human perceptual judgments. Human evaluation not required for compression robustness assessment.",
    210           "source": "haiku"
    211         },
    212         "held_out_test_set": {
    213           "applies": true,
    214           "answer": true,
    215           "justification": "Four separate standard datasets (KODAK, CITYSCAPES, NIPS, BSDS) used; no data leakage across train/test splits within the benchmarks.",
    216           "source": "haiku"
    217         },
    218         "per_category_breakdown": {
    219           "applies": true,
    220           "answer": true,
    221           "justification": "Results broken down by codec (10 types), attack method (6 + random), loss function (6 targets), and dataset implicitly in aggregation ('Averaged for all tested datasets').",
    222           "source": "haiku"
    223         },
    224         "failure_cases_discussed": {
    225           "applies": true,
    226           "answer": true,
    227           "justification": "Section 5.4 analyzes artifact types (color vs. texture distortions) and shows CDC codec 'may be less robust by design.' Section 5.6 shows some defenses only partially effective.",
    228           "source": "haiku"
    229         },
    230         "negative_results_reported": {
    231           "applies": true,
    232           "answer": true,
    233           "justification": "Figure 8 shows Geometric self-ensemble and DiffPure defenses offer minimal protection; reconstruction-based losses shown less effective than FTDA default; some attacks fail on JPEG AI.",
    234           "source": "haiku"
    235         }
    236       },
    237       "setup_transparency": {
    238         "model_versions_specified": {
    239           "applies": true,
    240           "answer": true,
    241           "justification": "JPEG AI versions named (4.1, 5.1, 6.1) with HOP/BOP variants. Other codecs identified by paper + year (Cheng2020, ELIC 2022, etc.) per Table 2.",
    242           "source": "haiku"
    243         },
    244         "prompts_provided": {
    245           "applies": false,
    246           "answer": false,
    247           "justification": "NA—not an LLM evaluation study.",
    248           "source": "haiku"
    249         },
    250         "hyperparameters_reported": {
    251           "applies": true,
    252           "answer": false,
    253           "justification": "Section 4.6 states 'varied attack parameters (learning rate, number of iterations, perturbation bound)' but specific values (e.g., lr=0.01, iterations=100, ε=8/255) not listed in text.",
    254           "source": "haiku"
    255         },
    256         "scaffolding_described": {
    257           "applies": false,
    258           "answer": false,
    259           "justification": "NA—no agentic scaffolding; pure adversarial attack evaluation.",
    260           "source": "haiku"
    261         },
    262         "data_preprocessing_documented": {
    263           "applies": true,
    264           "answer": false,
    265           "justification": "Standard datasets used without custom preprocessing. No mention of resizing, normalization, or other data pipeline steps before attack/defense evaluation.",
    266           "source": "haiku"
    267         }
    268       },
    269       "data_integrity": {
    270         "raw_data_available": {
    271           "applies": true,
    272           "answer": true,
    273           "justification": "All four datasets are publicly available standard benchmarks; no custom data collection.",
    274           "source": "haiku"
    275         },
    276         "data_collection_described": {
    277           "applies": true,
    278           "answer": true,
    279           "justification": "Section 4.4 describes the four benchmark sources (KODAK Photo CD, CITYSCAPES, NIPS 2017, BSDS) with resolution and purpose; these are well-established datasets.",
    280           "source": "haiku"
    281         },
    282         "recruitment_methods_described": {
    283           "applies": false,
    284           "answer": false,
    285           "justification": "NA—no human participants.",
    286           "source": "haiku"
    287         },
    288         "data_pipeline_documented": {
    289           "applies": true,
    290           "answer": false,
    291           "justification": "Pipeline described at high level (compress image, apply attack, measure quality drop) but implementation details (quantization settings, compression ratio choices) not fully documented.",
    292           "source": "haiku"
    293         }
    294       },
    295       "contamination": {
    296         "training_cutoff_stated": {
    297           "applies": false,
    298           "answer": false,
    299           "justification": "NA—paper evaluates pre-trained models, does not train new ones on benchmarks.",
    300           "source": "haiku"
    301         },
    302         "train_test_overlap_discussed": {
    303           "applies": false,
    304           "answer": false,
    305           "justification": "NA—same as above.",
    306           "source": "haiku"
    307         },
    308         "benchmark_contamination_addressed": {
    309           "applies": false,
    310           "answer": false,
    311           "justification": "NA—standard compression benchmarks used; models pre-trained before paper submission.",
    312           "source": "haiku"
    313         }
    314       },
    315       "human_studies": {
    316         "pre_registered": {
    317           "applies": false,
    318           "answer": false,
    319           "justification": "NA—no human subjects.",
    320           "source": "haiku"
    321         },
    322         "irb_or_ethics_approval": {
    323           "applies": false,
    324           "answer": false,
    325           "justification": "NA—no human subjects.",
    326           "source": "haiku"
    327         },
    328         "demographics_reported": {
    329           "applies": false,
    330           "answer": false,
    331           "justification": "NA—no human subjects.",
    332           "source": "haiku"
    333         },
    334         "inclusion_exclusion_criteria": {
    335           "applies": false,
    336           "answer": false,
    337           "justification": "NA—no human subjects.",
    338           "source": "haiku"
    339         },
    340         "randomization_described": {
    341           "applies": false,
    342           "answer": false,
    343           "justification": "NA—no human subjects.",
    344           "source": "haiku"
    345         },
    346         "blinding_described": {
    347           "applies": false,
    348           "answer": false,
    349           "justification": "NA—no human subjects.",
    350           "source": "haiku"
    351         },
    352         "attrition_reported": {
    353           "applies": false,
    354           "answer": false,
    355           "justification": "NA—no human subjects.",
    356           "source": "haiku"
    357         }
    358       },
    359       "cost_and_practicality": {
    360         "inference_cost_reported": {
    361           "applies": true,
    362           "answer": false,
    363           "justification": "No inference time, latency, or memory footprint reported for attacks or defenses. Only hardware (120 A100 GPUs) mentioned but not total compute hours or cost.",
    364           "source": "haiku"
    365         },
    366         "compute_budget_stated": {
    367           "applies": true,
    368           "answer": false,
    369           "justification": "Section 4.6 lists hardware resources but no total GPU-hours, wall-clock time, or budget breakdown across 10 codecs × 6 attacks × 4 datasets.",
    370           "source": "haiku"
    371         }
    372       }
    373     }
    374   },
    375   "claims": [
    376     {
    377       "claim": "JPEG AI shows relatively high robustness compared to other neural image compression models",
    378       "evidence": "Figure 3 shows ∆VMAF (quality drop under attack) for all 10 codecs; JPEG AI variants rank in top tier for most attack types.",
    379       "supported": "strong"
    380     },
    381     {
    382       "claim": "HOP variants of JPEG AI are less robust than BOP variants",
    383       "evidence": "Figure 3 and Section 5.2 explicitly state 'High-operation point versions of JPEG AI are less robust than base-operation point'; consistent across all attacks.",
    384       "supported": "strong"
    385     },
    386     {
    387       "claim": "JPEG AI robustness improves with newer versions (6.1 > 5.1 > 4.1)",
    388       "evidence": "Section 5.2: 'robustness of JPEG AI improved with a newer version (6.1 compared to 5.1)'; Figure 3 shows ordering.",
    389       "supported": "strong"
    390     },
    391     {
    392       "claim": "Adversarial attacks increase the size of compressed images even without BPP-targeted optimization",
    393       "evidence": "Figure 4 shows increased bitrate (positive ∆BPP) for attacks not optimizing BPP; Section 5.3 explains via altered rate-distortion tradeoff.",
    394       "supported": "strong"
    395     },
    396     {
    397       "claim": "Different codecs are vulnerable to different attack types",
    398       "evidence": "Section 5.2: 'Cheng2020 is subject to I-FGSM and FTDA attacks, which are ineffective against JPEG AI'; codec-specific vulnerability patterns evident in Figure 3.",
    399       "supported": "strong"
    400     },
    401     {
    402       "claim": "Simple reversible defenses (flip, roll, rotate) can partially mitigate adversarial attacks",
    403       "evidence": "Figure 8 shows Flip, Random Ensemble, and Random Roll reduce ∆PSNR by 5–20 points on FTDA/I-FGSM attacks.",
    404       "supported": "moderate"
    405     },
    406     {
    407       "claim": "Adversarial attacks transfer between JPEG AI versions, especially from lower to higher bitrates",
    408       "evidence": "Section 5.5 and Figure 7 show high transferability between JPEG AI versions, with stronger transfer from lower bitrates (b0002) to higher ones (b05).",
    409       "supported": "strong"
    410     },
    411     {
    412       "claim": "Color artifacts are a major driver of quality degradation under attack, more so than texture artifacts",
    413       "evidence": "Figure 5 shows Color metric correlates r=0.72 with ∆PSNR while Texture metric shows minimal correlation; Section 5.4 confirms artifacts on reconstructed images show stronger color distortions.",
    414       "supported": "moderate"
    415     }
    416   ],
    417   "methodology_tags": [
    418     "benchmark-eval",
    419     "observational",
    420     "case-study"
    421   ],
    422   "key_findings": "This empirical evaluation demonstrates that JPEG AI achieves >50% bitrate savings vs. legacy codecs while maintaining competitively high adversarial robustness. The paper systematically compares 10 neural compression models across 6 white-box attacks and multiple quality metrics. Key findings: (1) JPEG AI 6.1 is more robust than earlier versions, with BOP variants outperforming HOP; (2) different codecs show codec-specific vulnerability patterns, suggesting architecture influences robustness; (3) simple reversible defenses (spatial transforms) offer partial mitigation; (4) attacks transfer effectively between JPEG AI versions, raising standardization concerns; (5) color artifacts dominate quality degradation under attack, not texture.",
    423   "red_flags": [
    424     {
    425       "flag": "No statistical significance testing",
    426       "detail": "All results reported as point estimates; 4 attack runs averaged without confidence intervals or variance reporting, making it unclear if differences are robust."
    427     },
    428     {
    429       "flag": "Missing limitations section",
    430       "detail": "No dedicated discussion of scope boundaries, threat to validity, or generalization limits. Conclusion mentions challenges but does not systematically address what the study does NOT show."
    431     },
    432     {
    433       "flag": "Funding source not disclosed",
    434       "detail": "No funding acknowledgments or conflicts of interest statement despite institutional affiliations with Russian research centers."
    435     },
    436     {
    437       "flag": "Code reproducibility delayed",
    438       "detail": "Link to code hidden for blind review; reproducibility cannot be verified at submission time."
    439     },
    440     {
    441       "flag": "Incomplete hyperparameter specification",
    442       "detail": "Attack learning rates, iteration counts, and perturbation bounds mentioned as varied but specific values not provided in text."
    443     },
    444     {
    445       "flag": "No mechanistic explanation for robustness differences",
    446       "detail": "Paper documents that HOP is less robust than BOP and CDC is weakest, but does not isolate architectural features (attention, context modeling) responsible for these differences."
    447     },
    448     {
    449       "flag": "Limited defense evaluation",
    450       "detail": "Evaluated defenses are reversible image transforms and one diffusion-based method; no adversarially-trained defenses or certified robustness approaches explored."
    451     },
    452     {
    453       "flag": "Environment specs incomplete",
    454       "detail": "Hardware listed but no Python version, JPEG AI version numbers for training, or Docker/conda environment file provided for reproduction."
    455     }
    456   ],
    457   "cited_papers": [
    458     {
    459       "title": "End-to-end optimized image compression",
    460       "relevance": "Foundational neural image compression work (Ballé et al. 2016); baseline codec architecture."
    461     },
    462     {
    463       "title": "Variational image compression with a scale hyperprior",
    464       "relevance": "Introduces hyperprior entropy model used in multiple evaluated codecs; key compression technique."
    465     },
    466     {
    467       "title": "Toward robust neural image compression: Adversarial attack and model finetuning",
    468       "relevance": "Prior work on NIC adversarial robustness (Chen & Ma 2023); defines ∆PSNR metric extended in this paper."
    469     },
    470     {
    471       "title": "Manipulation attacks on learned image compression",
    472       "relevance": "Early adversarial attack on neural compression (Liu et al. 2023); establishes attack methodology."
    473     },
    474     {
    475       "title": "The jpeg ai standard: Providing efficient human and machine visual data consumption",
    476       "relevance": "Official JPEG AI standardization paper (Ascenso et al. 2023); primary subject of evaluation."
    477     },
    478     {
    479       "title": "Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks",
    480       "relevance": "PGD attack introduction (Madry et al. 2018); foundational adversarial robustness methodology."
    481     },
    482     {
    483       "title": "Adversarial examples in the physical world",
    484       "relevance": "I-FGSM attack (Kurakin et al. 2018); one of six attacks evaluated."
    485     },
    486     {
    487       "title": "Diffusion models for adversarial purification",
    488       "relevance": "DiffPure defense (Nie et al. 2022); defense baseline used in Section 5.6."
    489     },
    490     {
    491       "title": "Comparing the robustness of modern no-reference image- and video-quality metrics to adversarial attacks",
    492       "relevance": "Related work on adversarial robustness of quality metrics themselves (Antsiferova et al. 2024); metric validation."
    493     }
    494   ],
    495   "engagement_factors": {
    496     "practical_relevance": {
    497       "score": 2,
    498       "justification": "JPEG AI is a real ISO/IEC standard for consumer devices, giving practical stakes; however, adversarial attacks on image compression codecs are low-probability real-world threats vs. other security concerns."
    499     },
    500     "surprise_contrarian": {
    501       "score": 1,
    502       "justification": "Results align with expected findings: newer codec versions are more robust, different architectures have different robustness profiles. No surprising reversals or counterintuitive claims."
    503     },
    504     "fear_safety": {
    505       "score": 1,
    506       "justification": "Paper addresses adversarial robustness but in a niche domain (image compression security). No broader AI safety or alignment implications discussed."
    507     },
    508     "drama_conflict": {
    509       "score": 0,
    510       "justification": "Technical benchmarking paper with no controversy, disputes, or conflicting stakeholders. Straightforward empirical evaluation."
    511     },
    512     "demo_ability": {
    513       "score": 2,
    514       "justification": "Could produce visual demos of adversarial attacks and defenses on JPEG AI outputs; code promised but currently unavailable. Requires GPU and specialized setup."
    515     },
    516     "brand_recognition": {
    517       "score": 2,
    518       "justification": "JPEG AI is an official standard with real-world deployment; authors from reputable institutions (MSU, ISP RAS). Moderate credibility but niche audience (compression researchers)."
    519     }
    520   },
    521   "hn_data": {
    522     "threads": [
    523       {
    524         "hn_id": "41947355",
    525         "title": "Universal optimality of Dijkstra via beyond-worst-case heaps",
    526         "points": 203,
    527         "comments": 47,
    528         "url": "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41947355"
    529       },
    530       {
    531         "hn_id": "44742187",
    532         "title": "Deploying Large Language Models with Retrieval Augmented Generation (2024)",
    533         "points": 1,
    534         "comments": 0,
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    563 }

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